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1. Introduction 
  
Peak human performance—whether of Olympic athletes, Nobel prize winners, or 
Carnegie Hall musicians—depends on skill. Skill is at the heart of what it means to 
excel. Yet, the fixity of skilled behavior can sometimes make it seem a lower-level 
activity, more akin to the movements of an invertebrate or a machine. Experts in 
multiple domains have described what they do as sometimes “automatic.” Expert 
gamers describe themselves as “playing with” automaticity (Taylor and Elam 2018). 
Expert musicians are said to balance automaticity with creativity through performance 
cues: “Performance cues allow the musician to attend to some aspects of the 
performance while allowing others to be executed automatically” (Chaffin and Logan 
2006). Peak performance in elite athletes is often described as automatic by those 
athletes: “The most frequent response from participants (eight athletes and one coach) 
when describing the execution of a peak performance was the automatic execution of 
performance” (Anderson et al. 2014). For some, the automaticity of skilled behavior 
challenges the idea that it exhibits human excellence. And so two camps have 
developed: those who focus on the automaticity of skilled behavior, the “habitualists,” 
and those who focus on the higher-level cognition of peak performance, the 
“intellectualists.”  
We take a different tack. We argue that skilled behavior weaves together 
automaticity and higher-level cognition, which we call “pluralism.” Just how it is so 
weaved will depend on the form of pluralism. We present three forms in this paper: level 
pluralism, synchronic pluralism, and diachronic pluralism. We find that diachronic 
pluralism presents the strongest case against habitualism and intellectualism, especially 
when considered through the example of strategic automaticity. In each case of 
pluralism, we use research on attention and mind-wandering to explore the presence or 
absence of higher-level cognition in skilled behavior.  
 
 
2. The Debate: Intellectualism vs. Habitualism 
  
There is widespread agreement that as one learns a skill, one’s actions become more 
automatic and rely less on rules and heuristics (Anderson 1982; Dreyfus 1980). 
However, there does not appear to be a consensus concerning the relationship between 
higher-level cognition and skilled behavior. By “higher-level cognition,” we mean 
processes such as thought, reflection, planning, intention-formation, and voluntary 
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attention. Whereas some accounts of skilled behavior take a complete lack of higher-
level cognition to be a defining feature (Dreyfus 2007), other accounts emphasize that 
experts are frequently reflecting and thinking about what they are doing while acting 
skillfully (Montero 2010).  Papineau (2015) identifies two theoretical camps concerning 
this problem: habitualism and intellectualism. Whereas habitualist accounts claim that 
higher-level cognition is detrimental to skilled behavior, intellectualist accounts claim 
that higher-level cognition is beneficial to skilled behavior. We think about the difference 
in terms of the presence or absence of higher-level cognition: is higher-level cognition a 
normal part of skilled behavior, as the intellectualist claims, or not, as the habitualist 
claims? We will be arguing for a pluralist approach: certain aspects of skilled behavior 
normally occur without higher-level cognition, whereas other aspects normally occur 
with higher-level cognition. 
  
2.1 Habitualism 
  
Dreyfus (2007) is perhaps the most well-known defender of the habitualist account of 
skilled behavior. His position on skilled behavior is most clearly presented in what is 
known as the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. Dreyfus (2007) accuses McDowell of 
succumbing to “the myth of the mental” or the idea that conceptual mindedness 
permeates our lives, and he argues that “know-how” (knowledge about how to act in the 
world) is the foundation from which “know-that” (knowledge about matters of fact about 
the world) can arise. He points to cases in which experts experience absorbed bodily 
coping or what has otherwise been referred to as “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi 1997). During 
absorbed bodily coping or flow, Dreyfus claims that experts have “a kind of non-mental 
content that is non-conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational, and non-linguistic” (352). 
Because know-that can often interfere with know-how, Dreyfus claims that experts 
perform best in the absence of higher-level cognition. His account is inspired by ideas 
from dynamical systems theory and Gibsonian ecological psychology: the mark of 
expertise is the experts’ ability to immediately and automatically respond to the 
solicitations of affordances without the aid of higher-level cognition, such as 
representations (a target of dynamical systems theory).1 Montero (2010) has referred to 
this as the “principle of automaticity.” 
A major advantage of Dreyfus’ account is that it seems intuitive—focusing on 
one’s actions too intently can certainly be detrimental at times. Although Dreyfus’ 
arguments do not rely on literature from sports psychology, there are studies from this 
domain on the phenomenon of choking under pressure that support the view. That is, 
some of the research on choking under pressure supports habitualism and gives us 
reason to doubt intellectualism about skilled behavior. Choking under pressure refers to 
                                                
1 Affordances are, roughly, possibilities for behavior that reflect the fit between an agent’s action 
capabilities and the properties of the environment (Gibson 2014).  
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a decrease in performance when experts experience pressure or stress in response to a 
given situation. There are multiple accounts of choking, but particularly supportive of 
Dreyfus is the explicit monitoring hypothesis. The explicit monitoring hypothesis claims 
that pressure causes experts to allocate attentional resources to the execution of one’s 
actions in such a way that it is detrimental to performance (Beilock and Carr 2001). 
Thinking about one’s actions thus degrades expert performance on this account, 
supporting Dreyfus’ position. 
If habitualism is correct, skilled behavior is most successful when higher-level 
cognition does not interfere with the automatic, procedural processing underlying action 
execution. However, the fact that higher-level cognition may be detrimental in some 
circumstances (such as in particular experimental set-ups in sports psychology 
experiments) does not entail that all instances of higher-level cognition during skilled 
behavior are detrimental. That is, even if we accept the findings above, they may apply 
only in specific circumstances such that there may be other contexts in which skilled 
behavior involves non-automatic, deliberate cognitive processing. 
  
2.2 Intellectualism 
  
Montero is perhaps the most avid defender of intellectualist accounts of skilled behavior, 
and she frequently draws on her past experiences as a ballet dancer in order to argue 
against habitualism and the principle of automaticity. In Montero (2010), she claims that 
higher-level cognition is often essential to skilled behavior, and she refers to the idea 
that thinking about one’s bodily movements always disrupts performance as “the 
Maxim.” She argues against the Maxim by appealing to inconsistencies in first-person 
reports (some experts claim that thinking helps them, while others claim that thinking 
hurts them), skepticism about the applicability of the findings from sports psychology to 
other domains of expertise (deliberate thinking may not be detrimental in all forms of 
expert action), and experts’ desire to constantly improve. We find her argument from 
experts’ desire to constantly improve to be the strongest argument against habitualism 
because it directly confronts the habitualist’s claim that automaticity is the defining 
feature of expertise. 
Montero (2010) argues against Dreyfus’ Maxim by appealing to kaizen: a 
Japanese word for experts’ desire to constantly improve. She argues that kaizen is what 
is responsible for experts’ tendency to push the boundaries of what is possible in given 
domains of expertise and that one’s ability to actualize the desire to improve relies on 
actively thinking about what one is doing. That is, automaticity cannot explain how 
experts are able to perform at peak levels, and so we must appeal to higher-level 
cognition. She uses Tiger Woods as an example. Despite already being the best golfer 
in the world, he altered his swinging style in order to improve his performance. Although 
this change of swinging style temporarily degraded performance, he was eventually 
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able to master the new action, and his golfing was substantially improved overall. The 
habitualist might point to the temporary degradation in performance as evidence against 
intellectualism; however, Montero insists that the fact that experts can and frequently do 
focus on the specifics of their actions in order to improve themselves is strong evidence 
against the Maxim and the principle of automaticity. Without higher-level cognition, 
experts would struggle to discover new, creative ways of acting skillfully that ultimately 
allow them to reach peak performance levels. 
So, it seems that under some circumstances, thinking about what you are doing 
can disrupt expert action (see the sports psychology literature on choking under 
pressure). However, in other circumstances, experts may need to deliberately think 
about what they are doing in order to adapt to the demands of a given situation or push 
the boundaries of their domain of expertise. When things are going smoothly or one is 
content with their level of expertise, the habitualists may be correct about the 
relationship between thought and expert action—higher-level cognition may only serve 
to interrupt one’s actions. However, there are situations in which experts must go 
beyond automaticity, and we think intellectualists are correct to emphasize this point. 
  
3. Pluralism 
  
Hopefully, at this point, we have provided a sense of why one might adopt either a 
habitualist or intellectualist stance on expert action. The habitualists are correct to 
emphasize that automaticity is a key part of skilled behavior; however, they emphasize 
this point at the expense of any sort of higher-level cognition. The intellectualists are 
correct to emphasize that higher-level cognition can occur during (and be beneficial to) 
skilled behavior; however, they do not provide an account of situations in which skilled 
behavior unfolds automatically. Crucially, neither account specifies the ways in which 
automaticity and higher-level cognition may interact during skilled behavior. For the 
above reasons, we believe neither habitualism nor intellectualism are adequate 
accounts of skilled behavior. It is our view that a pluralist account of skilled behavior that 
specifies relationships between automaticity and higher-level cognition is preferable to 
existing accounts that focus on either automaticity or higher-level cognition in isolation. 
We are inspired by the pluralism described in Dale, Dietrich, and Chemero 
(2009), who argue that it is often fruitful to investigate how competing theories in 
cognitive science may work together, rather than exploring those theories in isolation. 
They focus on generating a pluralist position in which dynamical and representational 
perspectives are both viable and valuable to cognitive science, which we find to be 
relevant to the current debate between habitualists and intellectualists. Some have used 
this approach to explore how dynamical and representational perspectives can be 
applied to the same phenomenon, considered at different scales (see, e.g., Abney et al. 
2014), but we are interested in the idea that habitualism and intellectualism describe 
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different aspects of skilled behavior at the same scale. In short, the pluralist position we 
argue for here insists that both automaticity and higher-level cognition are features of 
skilled behavior, and not merely at different levels of description. 
         Although it has not been conceptualized as such, some of the groundwork for a 
pluralist position on skilled behavior has already been laid. Høffding (2014) criticized 
what he refers to as “Dreyfus’ dualism,” in which higher-level cognition and “skilled 
coping” are supposed to be incompatible. The crux of Høffding’s argument is that there 
is likely no single phenomenology associated with skilled behavior, rather, it is 
heterophenomenological. That is, skilled behavior includes moments of automaticity as 
well as higher-level cognition, such as planning. Whereas Høffding’s work focuses on 
rejecting Drefyus’ dualism and creating a taxonomy of possible phenomenological 
states associated with skilled behavior, the present paper will explicitly argue for a 
pluralist account of skilled behavior. 
The remainder of the paper will be spent articulating different ways one might be 
a pluralist with respect to skilled behavior. That is, we will explore three different 
conceptions of pluralism concerning skilled behavior: level pluralism, synchronic 
pluralism, and diachronic pluralism.  
  
4.) Level Pluralism 
  
Level pluralism is the view that different levels of skill correspond with different degrees 
of cognitive processing. As was noted at the beginning of section 2, there is widespread 
agreement that as one learns a skill, one’s actions become increasingly automatic and 
rely less on higher-level cognition. This idea is typically considered most compatible 
with habitualism: whereas novices must explicitly think about their actions while 
performing a skill, experts, having proceduralized the requisite motor behaviors, are 
able to do so without the aid of higher-level cognition. That is, as one learns a skill, the 
amount of deliberate cognitive processing required to perform the skilled behavior 
decreases. Habitualists further think that skilled behavior does not involve any higher-
level cognition at the level of mastery. We think, instead, that the increase in 
automaticity provides experts with additional ways to engage in higher-level cognition 
during skilled behavior, which is best understood through the tools of intellectualism. To 
illustrate the point, we use the case of mind-wandering during skilled behavior. 
Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler (2016) define mind-
wandering as a class of spontaneously generated thoughts characterized by their 
relative instability and lack of attentional constraint. Because mind-wandering typically 
occurs when attentional constraints are low, it is a promising candidate for a type of 
cognitive processing that may occur alongside automatic, skilled behaviors. Consider 
everyday tasks such as doing the dishes, doing the laundry, and driving a car—during 
these habitual tasks our minds frequently wander, ruminating on events other than 
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those before us. This demonstrates that higher-level cognition can occur alongside 
skilled behavior. Supporting this idea, there is evidence that practice decreases the 
dependence on executive control and working memory, and that mind wandering tends 
to occur in just such cases (Weissman et al. 2002; Smallwood et al. 2003). This is why 
everyday tasks are highly susceptible to mind-wandering episodes—as skill level 
increases, actions become increasingly proceduralized, and this proceduralization leads 
to a decrease in cognitive resources that need to be directed toward the task at hand. 
As a result of practice decreasing the cognitive load required to perform a given action, 
experts are more susceptible to mind-wandering episodes. 
         Note that we have so far described mind-wandering in terms of cognitive 
processing that is unrelated to the primary, skilled task. Habitualists accept that 
automatic skilled behavior occurs alongside this form of higher-level cognition. In fact, 
they sometimes use higher-level cognition in a secondary task to prove the automaticity 
of the first (in so-called “dual-task” experiments). To see how this works, consider the 
differential effects of mind-wandering on novices and experts. Because novices have 
not integrated actions into their procedural memory, mind-wandering is likely to have a 
detrimental effect on skilled action. That is, because novices need to focus on their 
actions while performing, mind-wandering may serve to distract them from the task at 
hand. However, experts, having integrated action sequences into their procedural 
memory such that their behavior may unfold automatically, are often able to 
successfully perform skilled behaviors while harboring thoughts with contents unrelated 
to the task at hand. Thus, the habitualist finds that different levels of skill correspond 
with different levels of task-related cognitive processing, but task-unrelated cognitive 
processing can increase as task-related cognitive processing decreases without cost to 
the skilled behavior. 
Yet, the presence of mind wandering in everyday tasks demonstrates room for 
task-related higher-level cognition in automatic skilled behavior, too. This is because 
mind-wandering can seamlessly return to the task at hand. Unlike habitualists, 
intellectualists typically object to the idea that task-unrelated higher-level cognition is a 
normal part of skilled behavior, since peak performance and skill improvement require 
the resources of higher-level cognition. As we see it, mind-wandering can play this role. 
One might, while thinking about something else, have an insight that leads to 
improvement in the primary task. At that moment, mind-wandering would count as task-
related higher-level cognition. Alternatively, one might mind-wander in a way that 
weaves the primary task into an imagined narrative or scene. This could enable one to 
maintain focus on the task, or to perform it in a slightly different way. This, too, would 
count as task-related higher-level cognition. Thus, the increased automaticity of new 
levels of skill can lead to new forms of higher-level cognition, rather than reduced 
cognitive processing, and we can see through intellectualism why this might be useful: it 
allows for new insights, creativity, and learning. We might adjust the claim of level 
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pluralism to the view that different levels of skill correspond with different degrees of 
required cognitive processing.  
Habitualists may object that any higher-level cognition in these cases “belongs in 
the gaps between or above moments of expert reflexive coping” (Bergamin 2017, 410). 
That is, higher-level cognition may occur between moments of skilled behavior (“gaps 
between”) or alongside skilled behavior (“gaps above”) without being a part of skilled 
behavior. According to Bergamin, it is obvious that higher-level cognition can occur 
between moments of performing expert “micro-tasks”; however, what is in question is if 
there is such processing in the moment of performing these tasks. Bergamin describes 
the switch between skilled behavior and higher-level cognition as occurring very 
frequently: “we slip from moments of smooth-coping into reflective thought and back 
again at incredibly frequent intervals” (412). As for the “gaps above” claim, the idea 
seems to be that task-unrelated higher-level cognition need not count as part of skilled 
behavior. Bergamin cites the expert musicians in Høffding (2014) who describe the 
experience as like “having two tracks running” (65).  
In our view, we should count higher-level cognition as part of skilled behavior 
when it is both task-related and procedurally integrated, such that it would be incorrect 
to describe the case as one of parallel processing, or “two tracks running.” There may 
be moments of skilled behavior that do not include higher-level cognition of this sort, as 
Bergamin suggests, but there are likely to be other moments that do include such 
processing. On some estimates, mind-wandering constitutes as much as 50% of our 
mental lives each day (Killingsworth and Gilbert 2011). We doubt that such a 
permeating feature of our mental lives would disappear when we engage in skilled 
behavior. In fact, given the finding that mind-wandering is more frequent for habitual 
behavior, we would expect it to occur while we engage in skilled behavior, even at the 
level of mastery. In our view, it is likely that in some cases this mind-wandering will be 
both task-related and procedurally integrated. For that reason, level pluralism does not 
clearly support habitualism at the expense of intellectualism. Instead, we find both views 
to explain different aspects of level pluralism: habitualists are able to explain the 
reduction in required cognitive processing, but intellectualists are able to explain the 
presence of new forms of cognitive processing.  
 
5. Synchronic Pluralism 
 
Whereas level pluralism is the stance that the degree of (required) cognitive processing 
in skilled behavior varies by the level of skill, synchronic pluralism is the stance that the 
degree of cognitive processing depends on the part or aspect of the behavior in 
question, combining insights from habitualism and intellectualism. Since these parts or 
aspects of skill co-occur at any given time, this is called “synchronic” pluralism. In 
contrast, diachronic pluralism, which we cover in the next section, is the stance that the 
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degree of cognitive processing will vary over the time course of a skilled behavior. In the 
last section we used the case of mind-wandering to explain level pluralism. In this 
section we will use the case of attention to explain synchronic pluralism, using a 
framework provided by Papineau (2015). Both attention and mind-wandering will come 
up again in the discussion of diachronic pluralism, in the next section.  
Papineau discusses a puzzle about the role of attention in skilled behavior: focus 
and concentration seem essential for skilled behavior, yet some have found attention to 
skill to degrade performance of that skill. Montero, for example, argues that experts 
“often do and should pay attention to or focus on what they are doing” (Montero 2016, 
214). Beilock and Carr, on the other hand, find in a number of experiments that 
“although close attention and control may benefit novice performers in the initial stages 
of task learning, it will become counterproductive as practice builds a more and more 
automated performance repertoire” (2001, 715). Papineau solves this problem by 
separating attention to the “basic action” from attention to its “components” (Papineau 
2015).2 A “basic action” is the action an agent intends to perform, whereas its 
“components” are lower level behaviors that make up the basic action. He uses shoe 
tying as an example: we can distinguish between the basic action of tying one’s shoes 
and the component movements required to do so (grab one shoelace, grab the other, 
cross the strings, make a loop, tie the loops together, etc.). Papineau thinks that 
attention is required for the proper execution of basic actions (à la intellectualism), but 
that attention to its components degrades skilled performance (à la habitualism). This 
account has close ties with level pluralism, since what counts as a basic action or 
component depends on one’s level of skill. Yet, even given a specific level of skill there 
will be parts or aspects of one’s behavior that differentially depend on cognitive 
processing, hence synchronic pluralism. 
Take the example of playing Smash Hit, a popular arcade game designed for 
mobile phones (Mediocre 2014). As one is moved along in this game, glass obstacles 
pop up and they have to be broken with steel balls. One gains more steel balls for 
breaking certain types of obstacles, and the game ends when one runs out of balls. 
Imagine that three glass objects block one’s path. At the beginning of play, one might 
intend to throw a ball at each object in turn and this may require attention to do so. Yet, 
as one becomes more skilled, the behavior of throwing three balls in quick succession 
may become the basic action. In that case, paying attention to the behavior of throwing 
a ball at a single object could degrade one’s performance. Synchronic pluralism dictates 
that cognitive processing varies for different parts or aspects of the behavior at a given 
time. In this case, one is at the same time throwing a steel ball at one object (a 
component of basic action) and throwing the first of three balls at three objects (a basic 
action), and one may require cognitive processing for only the second of these tasks. 
                                                
2 This is a move that Montero appears to endorse (Montero 2016, 15).  
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In terms of empirical evidence, there is ample support for Papineau’s framework, 
and for a claim of synchronic pluralism. Yamaguchi, Randle, and Logan (2016), for 
example, describe how typists “chunk” the components of their basic actions:  
“Chunking allows division of the labor involved in typewriting, such that the higher 
level control focuses on language processing (e.g., comprehending and 
composing sentences), whereas the lower level control focuses on keystrokes 
(e.g., translating letters into finger movements and moving the fingers to the key 
locations). Memory chunking interfaces the higher and lower level processes by 
associating one higher level unit with several lower level units, making parallel 
processing of keystrokes possible.”  
That is, the behavior of typing has different synchronic parts, some of which require 
more cognitive processing; one might type a specific sentence using a high level of 
cognitive processing, but at the same time execute specific movements using a low 
level of cognitive processing. Imagine, for example, that one is about to type the second 
letter of the sentence “the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog”: typing the second 
letter of the sentence requires a high level of cognitive processing, but typing the “h” key 
requires a low level of cognitive processing. That it requires a low level of cognitive 
processing can be seen in the fact that it is processed in parallel to the typing of the first 
key; that is, the leftward reach of the right index finger toward the “h” can be processed 
in parallel to the previous rightward reach of the left index finger toward the “t,” making 
the typing of these letters faster and more efficient. These synchronic parts are 
procedurally integrated via memory.  
One way synchronic pluralism can be explored empirically is through the focus of 
attention. Experimenters divide “proximal” focus from “distal” focus, wherein “distal” 
refers to the results of the behavior and “proximal” refers to the behavior itself. McKay 
and Wolf (2012), for example, found that novice dart throwing performance improved 
when attending to the target (distal focus), rather than the flight of the dart (proximal 
focus). In Papineau’s framework, this reveals the control of the dart’s flight path to be a 
component of the novice’s basic action of hitting the target, since attention to the dart’s 
flight path degrades performance. One might think that, in general, novices perform 
better with a distal focus. Yet, Kearney (2015) found that a distal focus is better for 
novice golfers only when performing simple putting tasks, but that proximal focus is 
better for difficult golfing tasks. Just as a distal focus can be used when a task is less 
challenging, it is more likely to be used as a task becomes more familiar. In one study, 
distal focus was found to be best for expert kayak sprinters in even the most challenging 
conditions (Banks 2015). Thus, the distinction between proximal and distal focus can 
help us to track which part or aspect of a skilled behavior requires the cognitive 
processing of attention.  
Synchronic pluralism is likely to be welcomed by habitualists and intellectualists 
alike. In describing levels of skilled behavior, Dreyfus allows that parts of skilled 
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behavior will be automatized while other parts are not (at least up to the point of 
mastery). In rejecting Dreyfus’ stronger claims Montero reports that she nonetheless 
agrees with him that skilled behavior can include automatic components. The idea that 
parts or aspects of skilled behavior are automatic, while other parts or aspects are not, 
is commonly found in work on the topic. Less commonly mentioned is the possibility of 
diachronic pluralism. This is the idea that the level of cognitive processing in skilled 
behavior will vary over the time course of that behavior. We discuss diachronic pluralism 
in the next section.  
 
6. Diachronic Pluralism 
 
Diachronic pluralism intersects with synchronic pluralism, since the parts or aspects of 
skilled behavior that require cognitive processing in synchronic pluralism typically occur 
over longer spans of time. We can nonetheless separate synchronic from diachronic 
pluralism. To use the examples from the last section, throwing three balls or typing a 
sentence take longer than throwing one ball or typing one letter. Yet, throwing the first of 
three balls or typing the second letter of a sentence take the same amount of time as 
throwing one ball or typing one letter despite having differential cognitive processing 
requirements. Whereas synchronic pluralism is the idea that different parts or aspects of 
skilled behavior correspond with different degrees of cognitive processing, diachronic 
pluralism is the idea that different moments in the time course of skilled behavior 
correspond with different degrees of cognitive processing. In this section, we discuss 
diachronic pluralism through both attention and mind-wandering.  
Task-related attention and mind-wandering are often described as opposed to 
one another, with mind-wandering occurring just when attention has lapsed: “Mind-
wandering, or those transient periods of time during which our attention momentarily 
drifts away from our on-going task and perceptual milieu, is fundamental to human 
neurocognitive function” (Kam et al. 2012).3 Further, mind-wandering is seen as 
normally periodic for healthy brain function, rather than as a cognitive failure: “Our data 
suggest that when trying to engage attention in a sustained manner, the mind will 
naturally ebb and flow in the depth of cognitive analysis it applies to events in the 
external environment” (Smallwood et al. 2008). In one hypothesis of what causes 
periodic mind-wandering, the default mode network that is active in mind-wandering is 
governed by slow-wave oscillations, which compete with and sometimes disrupt task-
related activity (Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos 2007). Another, non-exclusive 
possibility is that task-related attention is governed by slow-wave oscillations, and that 
the troughs of these oscillations allow for interruption by spontaneous neural activity 
                                                
3 Some distinguish the form of attention lost in mind wandering with other forms of attention that may be 
present in mind-wandering, such as “internal” attention or “unguided” attention (Chun et al. 2011; Irving 
2016). We set aside here the purposeful mind-wandering that is central to these accounts in order to 
focus on the periodic mind-wandering that occurs while performing a task. 
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(see, e.g., Saleh et al. 2010; West et al. 2012; Jennings forthcoming). These 
hypotheses pave the way for diachronic pluralism. 
Take again the example of playing Smash Hit: Imagine that while playing Smash 
Hit you find yourself momentarily thinking about an email you need to send when a 
looming obstacle brings your attention back to the game. This is a case of mind-
wandering, similar to those mentioned above. We are not always aware of mind-
wandering, and it may be that mind-wandering is more potent when we are not aware of 
it (Christoff et al. 2009). Yet, when we are aware of mind-wandering it is clear that our 
attention has shifted away from the task. In that situation, assuming this is not a case of 
split or divided attention, we are not likely using attention to perform the skilled behavior. 
Thus, even in the case that playing Smash Hit requires attention, we are likely to have 
moments during play when our attention is either diminished or elsewhere engaged. 
Hence diachronic pluralism: the degree of cognitive processing in skilled behavior 
depends on moment by moment changes in the time course of that behavior.  
Some might object that moments of mind-wandering should not be included in an 
inventory of skilled behavior, in keeping with Berjamin’s reasoning, above. Against this, 
we have claimed that mind-wandering can play an important role in skilled behavior, 
such as contributing to creative problem solving during skilled behavior (see also Baird 
et al. 2012). More importantly for this section, when mind-wandering is not itself part of 
skilled behavior it can serve as a sign that cognitive processing has diminished for the 
skilled behavior. The slow-wave oscillations that appear to govern mind-wandering and 
attention help to demonstrate this. Namely, if task-related attention is applied top-down 
via oscillatory brain activity then we would expect the observed periodicity, in which 
there are moments of more or less control over the skilled behavior. In the troughs, 
when attention has less power, mind-wandering can occur. On the other side of this, in 
line with the hypothesis from Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, the peaks of the 
oscillations that govern mind wandering may sometimes be high enough to interrupt 
task-related processing, depending on other factors. Thus, the very nature of attention 
and mind-wandering are such that diachronic pluralism is likely to occur in skilled 
behavior.  
Finally, some might object that metacognitive processing will be necessary to 
govern the relationship between task-related attention and mind-wandering, such that 
cognitive processing would be high for the skilled behavior even in the case of 
momentary lapses. Bermúdez (2017), for example, argues that attention is necessary to 
sustain the skilled behavior: “If you are acting skillfully, then you are reflecting, because 
performing a skilled action requires that throughout performance your attention is 
structured by a higher-order, performance-related intention.” On the other hand, recall 
that Yamaguchi, et al. claim that memory, not attention, is the source of coordination 
between the parts or aspects of skilled behavior, removing the need for metacognitive 
processing (“Memory chunking interfaces the higher and lower level processes by 
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associating one higher level unit with several lower level units, making parallel 
processing of keystrokes possible”).  
In our view, the periodic nature of attention and mind-wandering indicates the 
existence of diachronic pluralism, such that cognitive processing will ebb and flow 
throughout one’s skilled behavior. This view puts pressure on habitualism and 
intellectualism: it holds that at all levels of skill there may be periodic cognitive 
processing, which the habitualist denies, and it holds that there will be periodic 
absences of cognitive processing for skilled behavior, which the intellectualist denies. In 
the next section we review a special case that puts even more pressure on these 
accounts, since it more clearly demonstrates the features of diachronic pluralism: 
strategic automaticity.  
 
7. Strategic Automaticity 
 
A special case of diachronic pluralism is that of “strategic automaticity,” as described in 
Jennings (forthcoming). The term is used here to describe a situation in which the agent 
intentionally and strategically embarks on a sequence of automatic behavior. That is, in 
strategic automaticity the agent may use cognitive processing to initiate the behavior, 
but not to perform it. This case is only possible for highly familiar behaviors in highly 
familiar contexts. Thus, this is a case of skilled behavior that requires cognitive 
processing at one point in the time course of that behavior, but not in another. 
Strategic automaticity is normally mentioned in terms of what are called 
“implementation intentions” or “if-then planned behavior,” in which one intends to 
perform a certain behavior if a certain context arises. For example, one might intend to 
tap the screen during Smash Hit as soon as an obstacle arises. Martiny-Huenger, 
Martiny, and Gollwitzer (2015) make the case that these behaviors are automatically 
initiated, since their initiation is efficient, effortless, and unconscious: “We will argue that 
humans can willfully exert automatic action control by an anticipatory process of 
consciously linking a goal-directed response to an anticipated situation (i.e., if-then 
planning).’’ The authors mention the fact that the initiation of these behaviors is 
controlled by the medial, rather than the lateral prefrontal cortex as further evidence that 
it is automatic: “Gibert and colleagues found heightened activity in the lateral BA 10 for 
goal-driven behavior but heightened activity in the medial BA 10 for implementation 
intention-driven behavior. Thus, this evidence from cognitive neuroscience fits with the 
behavioral evidence and the assumptions underlying implementation intentions that if-
then planning delegates a person’s action control to situational cues” (Martiny-Huenger, 
et al. 2015).  
While Martiny-Huenger, et al. are careful to distinguish implementation intentions 
from habitual behaviors, the combination might lead one to argue for skilled behavior in 
the total absence of cognitive processing. In this version of strategic automaticity, the 
DR
AF
T
skilled behavior is not only automatically initiated, but automatically executed. This is 
because habitual behaviors are governed by subcortical mechanisms, such as by the 
striatum (e.g. Yin et al. 2005). Goal-directed behaviors are explicitly distinguished from 
habitual behaviors, the latter of which are stimulus-response pairings mediated by 
context (e.g. Thraikill and Bouton 2015). In contrast, goal-directed behaviors depend on 
outcome evaluation—an instance of high-level cognition (e.g. Gremel and Costa 2013).  
Against the idea that strategic automaticity is a case for skilled behavior in the 
total absence of cognitive processing, note that the implementation intentions are 
preceded by earlier intentions that depend on cognitive processing. That is, even in this 
extreme case cognitive processing is present to some degree, albeit at an earlier 
moment in time. This is what makes the automaticity strategic. Strategic automaticity is 
an ideal case of diachronic pluralism because it explicitly combines the features of 
skilled behavior at issue here.  
One reason that experts may sometimes favor strategic automaticity is to avoid 
choking under pressure, mentioned above: performing a familiar behavior automatically 
helps to prevent interruption of that behavior by other cognitive processing. Recall from 
the introduction that experts often describe what they do as “automatic.” Yet, in all of the 
cases mentioned, the automaticity is described as strategic and intentional. Thus, even 
if the skill is automatically executed, it depends on an earlier moment of non-automatic 
cognitive processing, supporting the claim of diachronic pluralism. 
Strategic automaticity is facilitated by chunking, described above. One way of 
thinking about chunking is that the cognitive processing for these behaviors is simply 
done in advance (e.g. Dezfouli and Balleine 2013). In the Smash Hit example, if 
throwing a ball at an obstacle takes x amount of cognitive processing, then throwing 
three balls at three obstacles would take 3x cognitive processing, even in the case of 
chunking the three behaviors together: the 3x cognitive processing would just happen 
before throwing the first ball. This is consistent with the finding that chunked sequences 
differ from non-chunked sequences in having a time lag before the first behavior in the 
sequence (e.g. Santos and Badre 1994). In this account, it would be appropriate to 
include the full time window, from planning to execution, in an analysis of whether or not 
the behavior requires cognitive processing, since the cognitive processing has 
apparently been redistributed over that window.  
Against this account, not only is the standardly observed time lag for chunked 
sequences shorter than one would expect on this account, some have found evidence 
that the time lag may not occur at all in those who are highly skilled. As described in 
Thompson, McColeman, Stepanova, and Blair (2017):  
“Athletes with medals in national or international competition showed no 
relationship between premotor time...and sequence complexity, while sub elite 
athletes with a comparable number of years of experience were slightly faster 
preparing for a single kick than for kick sequences of length 3 or 6 (Chen et al., 
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2015). Our results appear to be another example of weakening relationships 
between response time and Action Count.” 
Thus, it doesn’t appear to be the case that the cognitive processing is simply 
redistributed over a longer time period, but that cognitive processing requirements are 
reduced for at least some parts of the time window. This fits the account of increasing 
automaticity described in earlier sections. Further, the familiarity that allows for chunking 
comes along with other changes in skill execution that put pressure on the redistribution 
account. These changes, which we briefly reviewed above, encourage an interpretation 
of strategic automaticity in which cognitive processing is not required to execute the 
skilled behavior, even if it is required to initiate it.  
Thus, strategic automaticity challenges the intellectualist idea that cognitive 
processing is always present in skilled behavior to some degree. But it also puts 
pressure on the habitualist idea that peak performance is always automatic, absent of 
cognitive processing. Instead, strategic automaticity is a case in which peak 
performance is initiated by cognitive processing but executed automatically: a form of 
diachronic pluralism.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We have considered three varieties of pluralism with respect to skilled behavior: level 
pluralism, synchronic pluralism, and diachronic pluralism. All three are compatible with 
the empirical evidence on skill acquisition and skilled behavior. In the case of level 
pluralism, one becomes less reliant on higher-level cognition for skilled behavior as one 
gains mastery over that skill. Yet, evidence on mind-wandering suggests that forms of 
higher-level cognition may nonetheless occur alongside skilled behavior, sometimes 
even contributing to the skilled behavior. In the case of synchronic pluralism, some 
aspects of a skill may unfold automatically whereas other aspects may require higher-
level cognition. We used evidence on attention, and especially the distinction between 
proximal and distal focus of attention, to illustrate this idea. Finally, in the case of 
diachronic pluralism, we demonstrated that higher-level cognition naturally waxes and 
wanes, leaving moments in the time course of skilled behavior in which one is 
performing automatically even for demanding tasks. We combined evidence on 
attention and mind-wandering to make this point.  
We find that these cases challenge intellectualism and habitualism, taken alone. 
We suggest in their place a pluralist account, in which automaticity and higher-level 
cognition are woven together to facilitate skilled behavior. Some moments of skilled 
behavior may be fully automatic, and absent of higher-level cognition, whereas other 
moments of skilled behavior demand significant cognitive resources. Recall Montero’s 
appeal to inconsistencies in first-person reports on skilled behavior: we think this is 
further evidence for pluralism. Experts sometimes claim to be performing automatically, 
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but even in that case we find the strategic nature of their automaticity to require some 
distance from habitualism.  
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